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This paper analyzes the experience of the United States postal savings system, and (in less
detail) that of Japan, with a view to assessing the past and potential future role of postal
savings in Japan. The immense size of Japan’s postal savings system – accounting for
one-third of household savings deposits and comprising the largest “bank” in the world –
means that the question of their disposition is central to any discussion of the future of
Japan’s financial system as a whole. This study found that demand for postal savings
deposits is explained, in both countries, mainly by two variables: price (interest-
differentials) and confidence in private banks. Geographical accessibility in rural areas is of
less, and diminishing, importance. It is argued that postal banking should be viewed as an
alternative to publicly sponsored deposit insurance, as a means to assure households’
access to safe and convenient savings and payment services. This implies that reform
discussion should focus on the possibility of restructuring postal savings as a “narrow
bank”, in such as way as to ensure that services are priced to fully reflect costs and risks
incurred.
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I. Introduction and summary
Japan is one of many countries that is reconsidering the role of its postal savings system as
it prepares for  the financial realities of the 21st century. Postal banks, which were
introduced in most industrial countries during the second half of the 19th century or the
early part of this century, are generally deemed to have served useful purposes in the past:
They made deposit and payment services accessible to lower-income and non-urban
households; provided a demonstrably safe deposit outlet in times of uncertainty about
private banks; and may have raised household savings rates thus helping to fund both
public and private capital needs. But, in every case, vast changes that have occurred in
modern economies – including the spread of transportation and communications networks,
the growing capability of private intermediaries to provide financial services, and official
monetary institutions’ increased ability to avoid financial panics – have called into question
the continued appropriateness of the postal bank’s traditional role.
Japan is in fact well behind other countries in addressing this need for change. The United
States and Canada both abolished their postal savings systems thirty years ago, New
Zealand and a number of European countries have privatized theirs starting in the 1980s1
and most other European countries have taken at least some steps to privatize or streamline
their postal banks in recent years. Being a laggard gives Japan the advantage of a great deal
of relevant experience that it can use to inform its own future choices, but so far most of
the discussion of Japanese postal savings reform has taken place in a vacuum. Japan’s
postal savings system is so large – taking a third of household deposits and funding a vast
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 Taiwan and Argentina have announced plans for privatization this year.
3network of public lending institutions that constitute the largest “bank” in the world – that
there has been a tendency to view it as too singular for useful comparison. But, while the
scale is indeed unusual, and does have some special consequences for Japan, the basic
issues about how to structure postal savings are common across countries. Foreign
experience does, therefore, lend itself to application in Japan.
The United States admittedly is not the closest comparison: It started its postal savings
sytem later than most, in 1910, and ended it in 1966. Among other things, this means that
the United States provides no example of reform. The U.S. postal bank was never
authorized to offer payment services, other than the money orders that post offices had
always sold, in contrast with Japan and many European countries where the post office has
long been a major provider of giro services2. And, the size of the U.S. postal savings
system, even at its height in the 1930s and 1940s, never approached that of Japan. But,
even here, the motivations for establishing the U.S. postal bank, and the purposes it
actually served for several decades, were essentially similar to experience in Japan. And,
the arguments that led to abolition were also reminiscent of the discussion now going on in
Japan. This paper contends that a good deal can be learned from examining the role – for
better and for worse – that the U.S. postal bank played in the first half of this century. And,
if something can be learned from this, most distant, comparison, it probably means that
study of other cases would prove even more useful for Japan.
Several main observations are developed in the discussion below. First, while geographic
availability of depository services to areas not served by private banks was always a prime
justification of postal savings – in the United States as well as in Japan and Europe – it has
not proved to be the major source of demand for postal savings, even if it was important to
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 This term is used to mean direct payments to or from a bank account, that is without requiring an
intermediate exchange into cash.
4a few rural customers. From the start, the U.S. clientele of postal savings was concentrated
in urban areas among immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe, a group that had
most reason to seek the safety of postal savings after their experience with unreliable
“immigrant banks”. In Japan, as well, efforts to document the special relevance of postal
savings to households in remote areas have generally found its importance to be limited.
And, as in most countries, this factor also has declined over time.
Second, the demand for postal savings – at least in terms of changes over time – is well
explained by a simple deposit-allocation model based on relative interest rates and the level
of confidence in private banks. Other variables, such as changes in convenience or other
product features offered by the postal bank and its competitors, are important but most  of
the variation is explained by those two factors. Indeed, the demand schedule estimated in
this paper for the United States turns out to be quite similar  to that found for prewar Japan
in an earlier study by Teranishi (1977). Documenting such a relationship for postwar Japan
is more difficult, since most of the period saw no depository institution failures and
nominal interest-differentials were essentially fixed until deposit rates were liberalized in
1992 and 1993. But the existence of a price response can be documented – if not easily
quantified – by taking account of changes in product (including tax benefits) and in the
value of the “implicit put option” feature of the Japanese postal bank’s main product, the
Savings Certificate (Teigaku chokin) deposit. And, the importance of safety concerns can
be seen in behavior since 1990, particularly if regional variations are taken into account. In
Japan in the 1990s, as in the United States of the 1920s and 1930s, a correlation can be
seen between postal savings growth and the number of local depository-institution failures
by State or prefecture.
This model does not necessarily explain the very different levels of postal savings use in
Japan and the United States: Their share of total personal deposits has ranged upwards
5from 20% during most of the past 70 years in Japan, whereas it never got much over 5%
in the United States.3 However, the evidence reviewed below strongly suggests that this is
a function of the products offered and price: The Japanese postal bank has been allowed to
provide a much broader array of services than its U.S. counterpart, offers them in every
town and village of Japan, and has expanded its products and convenience of use over time
In addition, it has had more leeway to offer advantageous prices (or interest rates) relative
to private banks than was true in the United States. In some ways, the Japanese postal bank
actually faced less restrictive regulation than its commercial competitors – which, for
instance, required Ministry of Finance approval, not often granted, to open any branch in a
new location in response to demand. A definitive answer to what determines the level of
postal savings use, however, would benefit from a look at other countries – covering the
range including New Zealand, whose postal bank took a larger share of savings deposits
than Japan’s did before it was closed down in the 1980s, to the many European countries
where postal savings have a considerable role, but not as large as in Japan.
The experience reviewed in this paper makes several points. Not surprisingly, households
will respond to the attraction of a government-sponsored depository if it offers at least the
same return as available at private banks. Interest-rate setting procedures that – whether
intentionally or not – caused postal savings services to be relatively underpriced have led to
large shifts toward post offices from time to time, raising objections from commercial
bankers that the post office was overstepping its legitimate role. In times of financial
turmoil, when depositors became wary of private banks, they have been willing to place
funds in postal savings at significantly less than the privately offered return. There have
been times when this helped to stabilize the situation, as postal savings were redeposited
directly to solvent banks reducing the amount of cash drain out of the banking system. But
                                                
3
 These ratios are not perfectly comparable, as the U.S. share is of all time and savings accounts,
including those of companies. However the difference is still very big.
6there were other times – perhaps the most important example being in the United States in
the 1930s – when shifts to postal savings became disruptive because such recycling did not
occur and important lending intermediaries were deprived of funds.
So, even if it is desirable that the postal bank attract funds in a confidence crisis, the
systemic benefits will not be felt unless the “exit” side of the system is designed to assure
prompt recycling. And, even if such recycling is sufficiently automatic to keep the postal
bank’s role on the lending side completely neutral, distortions can still result unless prices
are set to fully reflect the actual costs and risks of the products offered. One approach to
both problems might be to revive the 19th-century European idea of postal savings as a
sort of “narrow bank” – investing only in credit-risk-free government securities, and
presumably hedging its interest-rate and liquidity risks in those markets, and offering only
such deposit rates it as would allow it to cover these costs.
If these conditions were met, it is possible that the postal savings market would shrink
drastically or even disappear. But it is also possible that a postal bank can play a beneficial
role as an alternative to mandatory insurance for household deposits. This was, in fact, the
reasoning that led postal savings to be accepted in the United States in 1910 – a time when
the moral hazard problems involved in government insurance schemes were widely
recognized, and postal savings was regarded as a less dangerous alternative. However,
neither of the requirements – full-cost pricing and neutral recycling – has been consistently
met in the United States or Japan, and the record of postal savings’ contribution has
therefore been flawed in both countries. This does not necessarily mean that a suitably
designed system could not work to the public benefit. It does mean, though, that the
discussion about how to design such a system needs to focus more directly on these issues
than it has, so far.
7II. The United States experience
A. Origins4
The U.S. postal savings system had a later start than most, as well as an earlier end.
Advocates, from the 1870s on, had cited the success of postal banks in most of the leading
countries of the world in arguing for such a system to encourage household saving in the
United States.5 But commercial bankers successfully opposed this as an unnecessary
incursion into the province of private business, until the banking panic of 1907-1908
brought the issue of safe banking facilities for ordinary people to national prominence. It
became an issue that was debated throughout the 1908 Presidential election campaign, in
which Republican William Howard Taft defeated Democrat William Jennings Bryan. The
incumbent Republican President, Theodore Roosevelt, endorsed the idea in 1907 and the
Republican Party included the proposal in its platform for the 1908 election despite the
continued opposition of the American Banking Assocation. The Democratic Party platform
called for a national guarantee of personal deposits, following what several States had
already done starting in 1907, and endorsed postal savings only as a second-best
alternative. The Republicans continued to oppose national insurance as too radical, stressing
the moral hazards of such a guarantee as well as the undesirably close national government
supervision that it would entail.6 But they were conscious of the need to head off growing
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 The history of the U.S. postal system is chronicled in parts in several places: Schewe (1970) covers
the entire period although it does not ask some of the questions most important to an economist;
Kemmerer (1917) is an account by one of those who created the system, and gives a good sense of its
conception and early years; O'Hara and Easley (1979) is an excellent analysis of the 1930s; and Zaun
(1953) gives some of the later part of the story.
5
 Schewe (1970) lists 64 bills submitted to the U.S. Congress for this purpose between 1873 and 1909,
not counting the 14 that were entered during the 1909-1911 Congress that eventually passed the Postal
Savings Bill of 1910.
6
 Taft, in his acceptance speech to the Republication national convention, called it a proposal to "tax
the honest and prudent banker to make up for the dishonesty and imprudence of others". He also
criticized the likelihood that supervisory oversight would deprive private banks of their independence
and, in essense, force State banks to become part of the National banking system. (quoted in Schewe,
8support for deposit guarantees, as one Western State after another joined the march toward
mandated insurance schemes. The Republicans' solid majority in the 1909 Congress,
combined with the new President's high-profile support, thus assured passage of the Postal
Savings Bill of 1910. Among the large industrial countries, only Germany – which during
the 19th century had developed an extensive system of municipal savings banks serving a
similar purpose – waited longer to establish postal savings.
One motivation that was lacking in the United States was the need to help finance the
national government.7 In fact, the absence of a sizable outstanding national debt posed a
problem in designing a system that would not compete with commercial bank lending
activities. Sensitivity was high, as well, to the possibility that a nationwide postal bank
might drain funds from local to big-city financial markets. To avoid this, the law provided
that postal savings were to be deposited in solvent commercial (National or State) banks
within the same city, town, village, or locality as they had been gathered, in proportion to
those banks’ capital. The placements were to be backed by suitable collateral in the form of
public securities “supported by the taxing power”, according to the discretion of the
nationwide postal savings system’s board of trustees (consisting of the Postmaster
General, the Treasury Secretary, and the Attorney General). Only when such local
placement was not possible could the trustees elect to place the money in banks elsewhere
within the same state, and if that outlet was not available in government securities.
Also to minimize competition with commercial banks, individual deposits were limited to
$500 (raised to $1000 in 1916 and $2500 in 1918), and the rates paid were fixed by the
legislation at a low level. The 2% rate paid to postal depositors, and 2 1/4% paid to the
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 Earlier, this had been an explicit motive for postal savings proposals that were advanced in the
1870s, when efforts were being made to refund the national debt that resulted from the issue of
Greenbacks during the Civil War.
9postal savings system for deposits on-lent to commercial banks, compared to about 3.5%
that most commercial banks were paying for private deposits at the time. The 2% rate was
never changed during the entire history of the postal savings system; the 2 1/4% rate was
raised once, to 2 1/2% in 1934.
The stated purposes of postal savings were essentially the same as had been advocated for
decades in the United States and other countries: providing safe, interest-bearing deposits to
savers who had no banking facilities within easy reach, or who had been made wary of
private banks by the repeated panics of the 19th and early 20th centuries. Wider benefits to
the overall economy were claimed as well, to result from educating ordinary people in the
habit of thrift, and from drawing money out of cash hoards into the organized banking
system. In addition to enchancing the supply of investment capital, some argued that this
would alleviate the problem of "inelastic currency" and help avoid banking panics – thus
overlapping a discussion about the need for a central bank that would eventually lead to
establishing the Federal Reserve in 1913.
According to Zaun, the system targeted four main categories thought not to infringe on
commercial banks: (1) Approximately 40,000 small communities where no banking
facilities existed, (2) hoarded cash in the hands of persons who lacked confidence in private
banks, (3) immigrants' remittances to relatives for deposit in foreign postal depositories,
and (4) children, students, and "people of small means" with whom banks did not care to
bother.8 Both advocates and opponents of postal savings were conscious that one major
client group would be recent immigrants from Europe, whether because those new
Americans were familiar with postal banks in their home countries, or because they were
more prone than most to have run into problems with private depositories including the
infamous "immigrant banks".
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 Zaun, p. 3.
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B. Clientele
The geographic inadequacy of private savings institutions figures prominently throughout
the discussion of starting a postal savings bank. Advocates invariably cited the predicament
of rural citizens who lived many miles closer to a post office than to a bank, and the lack of
savings facilities available in certain regions, particularly the Southern and Western states.
Commercial banks, even those that offered savings deposits, were said to neglect the needs
of ordinary households in favor of their main business serving a corporate clientele.
Specialized savings banks, to the extent they existed, were concentrated in New England
and one or two Midwestern states. Building and loan associations (the predecessors of
what are now usually called savings and loan associations) had experienced rapid growth
but mainly served urban households, especially in a few cities with large German-
American populations.
Support for postal savings was strongest in agrarian parts of the United States, as was
clearly reflected in the sponsorship of the many bills introduced in Congress. Of 72 bills
that were proposed between 1873 and 1909, only 5 were sponsored by legislators from the
New England and Middle Atlantic states; fully half were proposed by men from West of
the Mississippi. A prominent advocate, John Wanamaker, who as Postmaster General
devoted three Annual Reports to documenting the need for a postal savings facility, took it
for granted that "due care should be taken to provide first for the States without savings
banks." His     Annual Report  for 1892 reported statistics on the average distance from post
offices (deemed to be centrally located) to savings depositories, which ranged from 10
miles in New England to 33 miles in the Southern states and 52 miles in the Pacific states.9
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 Schewe, p. 31, and p. 37.
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While these geographic considerations were among the most persuasive and oft-repeated in
the campaign to establish the postal bank, they are not necessarily mirrored by the
distribution of postal savings clientele once it was established. In fact, one of the first things
that happened was that most of the postal depositories set up in fourth class post offices
(those serving the smallest communities) had to be closed because they had no deposits.10
By 1916, data by individual state show that there was no positive correlation between the
percent of population that had postal deposits and the scarcity (measured as population per
facility) of savings facilities at private banks.11 In fact, the correlation is a tiny negative, but
significant, a fact that may be explained by the concentration of immigrant clientele in
urban areas, as described below.
Rhetoric usually referred to the needs of Western and Southern states, but it is in the latter
that the argument had the most power. Distances between banks offering savings facilities
were notably larger in both the South and the West than elsewhere in the country, but in the
West this was a geographical reality that was also true of post offices. The relative
unavailability of banking compared to postal facilities was a feature primarily found in
Southern states: On average, they boasted 12 times as many post offices as bank savings
facilities in 1909, compared to a ratio of 6 in Pacific states and less than 5 in all other
regions of the United States.12 In the South, the issue was not merely one of geography but
also of institutional history. It could legitimately be argued that the relatively poor
population of this area was badly served by underdeveloped banking institutions and
therefore an ideal potential beneficiary of a postal savings system.13
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  The system was extended to fourth class post offices in its second year, and the number of postal
depositories grew from 7500 to 12,812. But of the 3831 fourth class offices, 75% had no deposits and
72% (2753) were closed in 1913. (Schewe, p.99)
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 Data from Schewe, p. 128-129, taken from the     Annual Report  for 1916 of the Board of Trustees of
the Postal Savings System.
12American Banking Association (1937), p. 9.
13
 Ransom and Sutch (1977) give an account of the lack of organized financial intermediaries – most
of which had served Southern plantation owners before the Civil War – and its effect on the post-
12
However, the statistics (which Congress required the Postal system to collect in a great deal
of detail during the first few years of the new system) show that Southerners were not
especially prone to make use of postal savings. In fact, the percent of population holding
postal deposits in 1916 was far below the national average in all of these states. Usage was
much higher in some of the Western states, but appears to have been concentrated in
mining towns – towns that contemporary analysts noted had large immigrant populations.
Statisics on race, collected only for 1912, were even more damning to the idea that the
system would reach the poor of the rural South: Blacks made up 1.8% of depositors,
compared to their 10.7% share in the total U.S. population, while the 88.8% of the
population that classified itself as Caucasian comprised 98.1% of clientele.14
What does come through clearly in all of the data that were collected about postal
depositors is the system's disproportionate popularity with recent immigrants. As
summarized by Kemmerer: "It is obviously to the small mining and industrial towns with
their large foreign born populations that the postal savings system is rendering its greatest
service."15 Among locations where there were large deposits, the largest postal savings per
capita were found in Leadville, Colorado in 1916. The rest of the list is equally illustrative,
almost exclusively made up of mining towns in the West and industrial cities of the Middle
West, Pacific Coast, and Eastern Seaboard.16
The table below makes the point well enough:
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 Kemmerer, pp. 72 nd 73.
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Table 1
Postal Depositors by Country of Birth
% of total       % of U.S. Deposits/
deposits       population capita
in 1915      1910 census 1915
Greece    1.8 0.11 $11.70
Russia 20.7 1.86     7.85
Italy 14.2 1.44     6.95
Hungary     4.3 0.53     5.69
Austria    8.7 1.26       4.86
Sweden     2.2 0.71     2.17
Great Britain, Ireland & Canada     8.8 4.04     1.53
Germany     4.1  2.68     1.08
Other foreign   7.0 1.68     2.94
Total foreign  71.8 14.3     3.35
United States  28.2 85.7     0.23
Source: Kemmerer, p. 6 (taken from    The United States Postal Savings System    , pamphlet issued by the Post
Office Department in 1916) These data also appear in Schewe, p. 122.
Kemmerer notes that these data somewhat overstate the case, since the proportion of the
immigrant populations above the eligible age of 10 years was much higher than that of
native-born Americans (97%, as opposed to 75%). However, even if adjusted for this fact
the foreign-born population would represent fewer than 18% of eligible persons, making
their 72% share of deposits still remarkable.
This did not come as a surprise. In fact, the Post Office actively sought immigrant deposits
in the early years, issuing circulars in 23 languages and providing special assistance for
non-English-speaking users. The fact that large amounts of money were being sent by
money order to European countries, for deposit in postal or other banks, had been much
observed as a reason to expect the postal bank would serve a purpose. U.S. postal officials
proudly noted the declines in such outflows, which had been growing rapidly up to 1911,
14
that occurred once the U.S. postal savings system was set up in that year.17 (Later on, when
the issue of competition with private banks became more serious, the Postmaster General
would make a point of the fact that the system did not advertise, and was not "promoted in
any way".18)
The attraction of postal deposits to recent immigrants was attributed to two factors: their
greater familiarity with postal savings, and their greater reluctance to use private banks,
compared to native-born Americans. The first was doubtless important, and consistent
with the pattern of foreign remittances cited above. But the greatest overrepresentation was
not necessarily among immigrants from countries where postal savings were best
established. The percentage of postal deposits in 1915 accounted for by Russian
immigrants, for example, was nine times as large as their share of the adult population; the
ratio for Italy was nearly as large at 8.6 and that for Greece was 12.7. The comparable ratio
was much lower for other groups: It was only about two for persons born in Great Britain,
where postal savings had existed for the longest time and were widely used.
Reluctance to use private banks was seen as partly a question of foreigners' lack of
knowledge about them and language difficulties, barriers that the new postal bank went to
some effort to overcome. Comparable barriers of unfamiliarity and illiteracy undoubtedly
kept many rural Southerners – especially blacks – out of banks, and would have been a
logical target of the postal bank given the rhetoric that had preceded its establishment. The
record does not tell whether postal officials made such an effort in the South, and were
unsuccessful (therefore failing also to spur the attention that was devoted to explaining
immigrants' use of postal savings), or whether they simply did not try.
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 Schewe, p. 117 and 120, citing A.B.A.    Proceedings   of 1913 and 1916.
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 Postmaster General's     Annual Report,  1945, p. 14.
15
The most persuasive reason for immigrants' behavior was their negative experiences with
private institutions, including the so-called "immigrant banks" in the United States. These
were not actually banks at all, but persons or establishments that offered deposit-type
services in conjunction with other business – the latter ranging from keeping saloons and
grocery stores to arranging steamship bookings and remittances to foreign countries. The
list of locations investigated by the Immigrant Commission in 1910, while it did not claim
to be a complete census, was presumably representative and it includes many of the same
industrial towns in the East and Middle West that were notable for their subsequent
success in collecting postal deposits. The Commission also noted that the clientele of these
"immigrant banks" was concentrated among immigrants from Southern and Eastern
Europe. In contrast, immigrants from the United Kingdom, Northern and Western
Europe, and from China and Japan were not much involved. (Interestingly, the Report
noted that while there were banks that primarily served Japanese immigrants in California,
these were properly licensed banks and not the subject of problems like those of the
"immigrant banks".)19 The Commission's adverse report was well publicized in the
foreign-language press of the time, and also led to legislation that restricted the activities of
such "banks", doubtless providing an extra boost to the new postal savings system's
attraction for new Americans. Coincidentally, the outbreak of World War I in Europe
disrupted the flow of remittances to some countries, likely reducing competition from this
source.
In later years, when commercial bankers became more concerned about competition from
postal savings, data were assembled to show that the geographical argument for postal
savings depositories was becoming even less valid as time went on. In 1935, they found
that only 21% of depositories were in towns that did not have private banks with savings
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 U.S. Immigration Commission (1910), p. 14.
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departments, and 9% of these were within 15 miles of a town with such facilities.20 In the
early 1950s, the proportion in bankless towns had gone down to 17%. Only in North
Dakota were more than 10% of postal deposits in bankless towns. Countrywide, fully 98%
of postal savings accounts were in communities that did have banks.21 Even the system's
role in serving immigrants seems to have disappeared by the mid-1930s, according to the
A.B.A.'s account: In a list of 43 American cities, the percentage of the population that was
foreign born bore a slightly negative correlation with the percent using postal savings.22
This they attributed to the declining flow of immigration to the United States, especially
after restrictive quotas were introduced in 1924, which meant that the average foreign-born
had been in the country for a longer time, and had acquired more familiarity with U.S.
institutions, compared to the early years of postal savings. Both the spread of private
intermediaries, and the lessened needs of immigrants, were advanced as reasons why the
postal system was no longer needed, and played a role in the eventual decision to abolish it.
C. A simple model of U.S. aggregate demand for postal savings
The U.S. postal bank was deemed a success in its first two decades, as it gradually
increased its size by serving the specialized needs of a limited clientele. Up to 1930,
although it grew steadily, the postal system never accounted for much more than 1% of all
time and savings deposits in U.S. banks. Subsequently, though, it experienced two periods
of explosive growth which increased its importance well beyond what the designers had
probably envisaged.
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 Zaun, p. 64.
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 A.B.A. (1937), p. 50.
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Postal savings share of time and savings deposits
1910 1920 1930 1940 19601950
at thrift institutions
at all depositories
Source: Historical Statistics of  the United States, p. 1032.
The first period of dramatic growth was in the early 1930s, and there is little dispute that
this was a response to the widespread failures of private banks during the Great
Depression. By 1933, postal savings had jumped to almost 4 1/2% of all time and savings
deposits in the U.S. banking system, and 7 1/2% of deposits at those institutions that
specialized in taking household savings.23 This interesting episode is well described in the
1979 article by O’Hara and Easley, as already noted.
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 Aside from postal savings, this includes deposits at mutual savings banks, savings and loan
associations (usually known as building or building and loan associations in the earlier period), and
credit unions (which came into existence after 1933). Unlike the category of “time deposits” at
commercial banks, which include corporate deposits, all of these can be assumed to be held by
individuals.
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% of all banks
Bank suspensions
1910 1920 1930 1940 19601950
by number of banks
by amount of deposits
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,     Banking and Monetary Statistics   ; data
before 1922, available only for the number of suspensions, from     Historical Statistics of the United
   States.  (Note that data for both lines are plotted through 1970, but negligibly small after the 1930s.)
The second growth spurt, however, occurred in the 1940s when confidence in private
banks should not have been a serious issue. Bankers at the time complained that the post
office was attracting deposits by continuing to pay its fixed 2% interest rate at a time when
commercial bank interest rates had fallen well below that level. And, in fact, the figures
show that postal savings did have at least a modest interest advantage from the mid-1930s
until the early 1950s, and this advantage was at its greatest during the 1940s (chart on next
page).
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% (2% rate on postal savings less average rate on bank time deposits)
Interest advantage of postal savings
1910 1920 1930 1940 19601950
Source: Goldsmith, pp. 406-407, and     Historical Statistics of the United States   , Part 2, p. 1041  .
The following is an attempt to explain the demand for postal savings deposits based on the
simplest type of stock adjustment model including price and wealth variables:
The model assumes that the desired share of savings deposits to be held at post offices, p*
is a function of relative interest rates, confidence in private banks, the level of average total
deposit savings, and other variables suggested by contemporary accounts. Adjustment of
the actual to desired share is only partially accomplished in each year, at a fixed rate λ,
whether because of transactions costs, lags in the formation of expectations, or perception
lags. This attempts to explain only the allocation between postal and other savings deposits,
taking the level of deposits as given.24 Thus,
pt –  pt-1 = λ (pt* – pt-1) and
pt* = α + β Xt + εt where X is a vector of variables including:
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 This is the simplest version of the more general formulation used in, for example, Benjamin
Friedman (1977). Some preliminary experiments with adding variables that reflect the greater ease of
reallocating incremental, as opposed to existing, wealth holdings, as described in that article, did not
yield significant contributions to the explanation.
20
r = the interest advantage of postal savings, represented as 2% less the average rate paid on
time deposits at private institutions. Data for the latter are taken from Goldsmith up to
1949. For the subequent years, they were calculated using the method that Goldsmith
applied for the 1934 to 1949 period, that is, the percentage ratio of interest paid on time
deposits at insured U.S. commercial banks to total time deposits outstanding in each year,
based on data from the     Historical Statistics of the United States   . The deposits total from
    Historical Statistics   covers all commercial banks, but the resulting interest rate is nearly
identical for overlapping year to Goldsmith’s, indicating that this difference is not
significant. (This differential understates the disadvantage of postal savings during the early
years, when a depositor was paid interest only on amounts that were kept on deposit for a
full year from the first month-end after he placed them. Starting in 1924, interest was paid,
but not compounded, on a quarterly basis.)
f = bank failures, represented as (1) the number of suspended banks (including
commercial, private, and mutual savings banks) in a given year as a per cent of the total
number extant at the end of the previous year, or (2) total deposits of suspended institutions
as a per cent of total outstanding deposits. Data are from the Federal Reserve’s     Banking
   and Monetary Statistics   from 1922 on. Data on the number of suspensions in earlier years
are from     Historical Statistics   (which presents the same, Federal Reserve data for the later
years).
w = total time and savings deposits outstanding, divided by the size of the adult population
of the United States, from     Historical Statistics of the United States.
m = the number of persons serving on active military duty as a per cent of the adult
population, from     Historical Statistics of the United States.
eu = Recent European immigration, represented as the number arriving in the previous five
years as a per cent of the adult U.S. population, from     Historical Statistics of the United
   States.
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The equation is transformed from the above as:
pt = αλ + λβi Xi + (1 – λ) pt-1 + λ ε
The equation was estimated using two-stage least squares, with lagged values of all
independent variables as instruments, to avoid problems associated with correlation
between the lagged dependent variable and the error term.
The estimated relationship for the period 1914 to 1967 is:
pt = 0.2138 + 0.0391  rt  +  0.0493  ft  -  0.0002  wt  +  0.0320  m t  +  0.8917 pt-1
        (0.56)     (0.24)   (5.92)        (-0.82)   (1.69)            (7.04)
(numbers in parentheses are t statistics)
Autocorrelation coefficient = 0.72
Standard error of regression = 0.215 R squared = 0.988
Durbin h statistic = 1.07
The above estimate used the number of bank suspensions as the “f” variable, to take
advantage of its availability all the way back to 1911, since the results were similar when
the deposit measure was used for the shorter period starting in 1922. The dependent
variable is postal savings’ share of all time and other savings deposits; results were similar
when the same exercise was done for postal savings as a percent of deposits at thrift
institutions only.
The immigration variable, eu, was omitted as it was not significant – except for the pre-
New Deal period, when it was significant only if the “wealth” variable was left out,
implying that the influence of the sharp decline in immigration up to the mid-1930s cannot
be distinguished from the upward trend in average deposit wealth.
If the hypothesis that confidence in private banks is a major factor is true, then it follows
that the New Deal’s introduction of federal deposit insurance should have made a
22
difference. A test for a structural break after 1935 indeed found significant difference.
Separate regressions (following the same two-stage least squares methodology) yield25
For 1914-1935:
pt = 2.959  + 1.5542  rt  +  0.1009  ft  –  0.0035  wt  +  0.0995  m t  +  0.6649 pt-1
       (3.81)      (3.73)  (9.30)        (-4.40)   (2.00)            (6.59)
Autocorrelation coefficient = -0.75
Standard error of regression = 0.267 R squared = 0.971
Durbin h statistic = -0.46
For 1936 - 1967:
pt =  0.2536 - 0.0122  rt  +  0.01790  ft  -  0.0013  wt  +  0.0316  m t  +  0.981  pt-1
        (0.45)     (-0.11)     (0.52)        (-2.16)     (3.96)          (10.85)
Autocorrelation coefficient = 1.13
Standard error of regression = 0.0926 R squared = 0.998
Durbin h statistic = 0.26
The test statistic for the difference between the restricted estimation, which assumes a
single structure for the entire period, and an unrestricted estimation allowing a different
structure after 1935, is 19.56, which is distributed as an F statistic with 23 and 22 degrees
of freedom, and is significant at the 1% level. 26
It should be recognized that most of the explanation here is coming from the two variables
representing confidence and price. In a regression of the share on an interest-differential
and the number of bank failures, 77% of the variation is explained if no adjustment is made
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 One could justify a slightly earlier break, since federal deposit insurance was part of the Glass-
Steagall Act passed in June 1933, and went into effect in January 1934 on a temporary basis.
However, the significance of the confidence variable appears to be at its height around 1934. It seems
reasonable to suppose that the behavioral change would have taken a couple of years to occur,
particularly as the amount covered was doubled to $5000 in July 1934 and the system was only made




for autocorrelation of residuals; and 96% with such adjustment (however the
autocorrelation remains high in the latter case, when the lagged dependent variable is not
included).
Bank suspensions are the only independent variable that is clearly signficant for the period
as a whole – and its signficance disappears after the New Deal as should be expected with
the presence of nearly universal deposit insurance. The implied relationship indicates that a
one percentage-point increase in the percent of banks failing leads to close to a half-
percentage point increase in desired share of deposits held at post offices. The implied
value of λ is 0.11, meaning that adjustment would take about 9 years to complete.
Results for the other variables are less convincing. The interest differential has the correct
sign in the period as a whole, but is significant only for the earlier period. This is
counterintuitive: If anything, the degree of price response would be expected to increase in
an environment where bank safety is not a concern. The deposit-wealth variable has a
negative sign, as expected given that there were ceilings on the amounts any individual
could place in the post office, and that wealthier individuals generally have wider asset
choice. It is significant for the subperiods (at the 1% level in the pre-New Deal period, and
at the 4% in the later period), but not for the period as a whole. It has a much higher
coefficient in the former period, and could be masquerading for some other variable with a
strong trend. One candidate for this, as noted above, is the sharp decline in European
immigration that occurred up to the mid-1930s, but it would doubtless be possible to
suggest others.
The “military service” variable was introduced to test a hypothesis advanced by some to
explain the rapid growth of postal savings during the mid-1940s.27 In addition to the fact
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 Schewe, pp. 166-167. I have not been able to find the cited references in the A.B.A.’s own record of
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that the postal system paid higher interest28, postmasters reportedly were seeing large
numbers of mailed deposits from soldiers away from home. Banking by mail, according
to Schewe, was a service not widely offered by private banks until after World War II, and
the example of the post office appears to have played a role in stimulating bankers to offer
it. The variable has the correct sign, and is significant at the 1% level in both pre- and post-
New Deal periods. But here, too, the coefficient is much larger in the former, and it is
signficant only at the 10% level for the period as a whole.
 D. Performance during banking panics
Edwin Kemmerer, in his review of the postal savings system's early performance, cited a
number of instances in which the system had helped to mitigate the effects of local bank
runs. Most were cases of a single bank failure leading to large withdrawals from other
banks in the same community, and to deposits at the post office which were then
redeposited in solvent local banks, thus limiting the spread of a liquidity crisis. Kemmerer
concluded that, aside from these abnormal situations, there were no cases known of
depositors' shifting funds from private banks to the post office. Rather, according to the
observation of "postmasters throughout the country", the great bulk of initial deposits had
come "from hoards, and from funds that formerly were sent abroad for deposit in the
postal savings banks and other banks of Europe". Similarly, the practice of making postal
money orders out to the name of the purchaser for safe holding apparently ended after the
postal savings system was established: About $8 million of these money orders had been
                                                                                                                                                
its annual    Proceedings   . Instead, I found references mainly to the interest-advantage of postal savings
as the reason for its increased popularity. However, the hypothesis is reasonable and certainly is not
refuted by the data. Zaun, too, notes that banks had increased their banking-by-mail service by the
early 1950s citing it as one indication of the lessened need for postal savings to serving “communities
lacking banking facilities” (p. 61).
28
 Zaun, p. 14, says that the average rate of interest paid by mututal savings banks on time deposits
was 1.7% in June 1947, and that the average rate paid by commercial banks was about 1%.
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issued during the 1907-1908 panic, but starting in 1911 these "were gradually cashed and
the use of the money orders service for this purpose therefter was negligible." Professor
Kemmerer's conclusion was that, far from causing problems by encouraging sudden
withdrawals from private banks, the postal system in its first seven years had actually
helped to contain local banking disruptions. However, he also noted that the question had
yet to be tested by a nationwide financial crisis.29
Episodes of bank failure continued to be common through the 1920s, and to be
accompanied by sudden shifts of deposits to postal savings in many instances. The postal
system's role in these crises continued to be accepted as benign so long as the
overwhelming bulk of  inflows were promptly rechannelled to solvent local banks. But in
the 1930s, when postal savings exploded in response to the nationwide banking panic at the
same time that interest rates plummeted with the onset of depression, the system broke
down. Banks became no longer willing or able to take postal deposits at the fixed rate of 2
1/4% (the more so, after the untimely increase to 2 1/2% in 1934), and the share of postal
savings system assets held at depository banks dropped from well over 80% to about half
in the three years ended in 1934. By then, U.S. government securities had jumped to nearly
two-thirds of the postal savings portfolio, compared to less than 10% during most of its
previous history. This breakdown clearly reflected mis-pricing, and was not confined to
situations of banking uncertainty: In fact, the percentage of redeposits continued to decline
even after the Depression, reaching well below 10% in the 1940s. But the experience of the
1930s demolished arguments that the postal savings system was helping to stabilize the
banking system, at the time when that help would have been most needed.
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 Kemmerer, pp. 78-79. The episodes, except for the U.S. Trust run in Washington, D.C., were all in
industrial or mining towns: Ironwood, Michigan, Lowell, Massachusetts, McKeesport and Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, and Youngstown, Ohio. Kemmerer quotes from the Third Assistant Postmaster-General's
    Annual Report  for 1915 and other Post Office statements. Schewe also recounts some of this evidence,












Assets of the U.S. postal savings system
1910 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70
Total assets
Time deposits at banks
U.S. government securities
Sources: Federal Reserve Board,     Banking and Monetary Statistics 1914-1941,  and U.S. Post Office Department,
   Annual Reports of the Postmaster General  .
The connection between lack of confidence in banks and postal savings demand is clearly
evident, not only in the time series data already cited, but in the experience of individual
states. During the 1920s, when bank failures did not reach unusual levels nationwide but
did in some areas, the use of postal savings was positively correlated with the number of
suspensions in each state, as illustrated in chart 5.
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     Chart 5
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Sources: Federal Reserve Board,     Banking and Monetary Statistics   , and Comptroller of the Currency,     Annual
   Reports   .
The relationship was significant in the Depression period as well, when a percentage-point
change in the number of banking suspensions was associated with about a 0.6 percentage-
point increase in the postal savings share (Charts 6 and 7).30
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 Data are for all 48 states and the District of Columbia, from the     Annual Reports   of the Comptroller
of the Currency and the Federal Reserve's     Monetary and Banking Statistics.  The correlation between
the postal share in 1929 and the number of suspensions, in percent, during the previous five years, is
0.51 in a regression including a constant, which is significant at the 1% level. The correlation with the
change in the postal savings share in the later period is 0.37 when suspensions are measured by the
number of banks, and 0.28 when deposit size is used, both significant at the 1% level. The coefficients
are 0.55 in the first case and 0.69 in the second.
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Sources: Federal Reserve Board,     Banking and Monetary Statistics   , and Comptroller of the Currency,     Annual
   Reports   .
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Sources: Comprroller of the Currency,    Annual Reports   and Federal Reserve Board,     Banking and Monetary
   Statistics   
29
The biggest impact of the 1930s turmoil was on commercial banks, but the effects on thrift
institutions were in some ways just as important. Failures were far less common at saving
(or building) and loan associations than they were at banks, but they started growing
rapidly a few years earlier, in 1929, and continued until the late 1930s. Commercial bank
failures, on the other hand, subsided quickly after 1933 (chart 8). O'Hara and Easley, in
fact, attribute part of the thrift institutions' difficulties to the postal savings system, which
competed directly with these S&Ls for retail deposits and also were not eligible to receive
redeposits of postal savings.















% of all banks
Number of suspensions
% of all S&Ls
1921 1923 1925 1927 1929 1931 1933 1935 1937
Banks
Savings (building) & loan associations
Source:    Historical Statistics of the United States   . “Banks” here include mutual savings banks, but a negligible
proportion of the failures was in this category.
While the scale was very different, the timing of deposit losses at the two classes of private
depositories suggests that post offices' gain was at the expense of both (charts 9 and 10).
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Postal savings vs. bank time deposits
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Source:    Historical Statistics of the United States   .














Postal savings vs. savings and loan institutions
$ mil outs.
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Postal saving deposits
S&L assets
Source:    Historical Statistics of the United States   
Mutual savings banks, in contast, actually grew slightly during these four years. While the
quality of their asset portfolios was badly hurt, only 11 actually failed during the 1930s
(compared to two in the 1920s) apparently causing many depositors to view them as a
comparatively safe place to keep their savings.31
Deposit losses were by far the greatest at commercial banks, whether measured in dollar or
percentage terms: By 1934 commercial banks had lost nearly 40% of the deposits they had
had on their balance sheets four years earlier (partly, of course, through disappearance of
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 Welfling, pp. 84-85.
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failed banks), whereas S&L deposits had shrunk to about three-quarters their previous size
(Table 2).
Table 2
Cumulative deposit changes after 1929
in millions of dollars as percent of 1929 level
Postal Commer- Mutual S&L Postal Commer- Mutual S&L
savings cial bank savings association savings cial bank savings association
deposits time dep. bank dep. savings deposits time dep. bank dep. savings
1930    21   148  260   270
1931   193  -866  980   110 130  -4 11   2
1932   631 -5508 1060  -380 423 -28 12  -6
1933 1037 -8708  820  -960 696 -45  9 -16
1934 1047 -7569  800 -1400 703 -39  9 -23
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce,     Historical Statistics of the United States from Colonial Times to 1970.  
The correlation between postal savings growth and bank time deposit losses across states,
as well, was higher than that for S&L deposit losses, although in both cases it was
signficant (charts 11 and 12).
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The S&L industry was a relatively small part of the financial system of the time, but its
difficulties may have had greater consequences for the economy than their size indicates.
These institutions were important as lenders of home mortgages in their local areas, a
business commercial banks were legally discouraged (in the case of national banks,
prohibited) from entering. They cite anecdotal evidence that – despite the fact that demand
for housing loans was sharply reduced by Depression economic conditions – these
institutions were unable to make good housing loans that they were asked for because of
lack of funds.32 Thus, while not a primary cause of Depression failures, the postal savings
system was implicated as a contributor that may have exacerbated some of the unnecessary
suffering resulting from imperfections in the financial system of the time.
E. Demise
In the early years the postal savings system won support even from bankers, who found
the system to provide negligible competition with their own deposit-taking activities and
admitted that it might even play a helpful role at times. Objections to improving the
system's services to depositors were gradually relinquished, paving the way for the
decisions to increase the limit on individual savings, to pay quarterly interest, and to
improve other administrative procedures.
The situation changed quickly during the 1930s, however, when bankers found the interest-
rate advantage of postal savings was drawing deposits away and the opportunity for cheap
redeposits no longer existed as an appeal. Already in 1937, the American Bankers
Association compiled evidence that the system was no longer needed for, and no longer
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 Pp. 747-748. The authors also point out that the S&L deposit data understate their difficulties, since
these institutions were allowed to go "on notice", requiring depositors to wait for withdrawals until
loan repayments came in. S&L assets were recorded at book value, so these data also underestimate
the declines.
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served, the purposes for which it had been created.33 Zaun's 1953 study substantially
updated and completed the bankers' arguments that these needs were being served by an
improved private banking system, by the U.S. Treasury's Savings Bond program, and by
federal deposit insurance. He also argued that the postal savings operations were not nearly
as cost-efficient as the Post Office's own study had found, citing various deficiencies in the
accounting procedures used by the Post Office as contributing to the "amazingly low"
operating expense ratios compared with those of private banks.34
Politicians, too, found use for the system in connection with government finances. Its
purchases of government bonds were credited with helping to finance U.S. participation in
World War I, and the deficit that the federal government incurred in the recession
following. In fact, the share of government debt in the system's portfolio jumped to about
two-thirds in 1921 and 1922, somewhat contradicting the spirit of the original law. During
the Second World War, when redeposit in banks was in any case not price-effective, these
bond allocations grew to about 94%, and they stayed above 90% thereafter. The System
played a major role, as well, in selling U.S. government savings bonds to the public, even
though at times this was perceived to be at the expense of the System's own takings of
postal deposits. By the 1950s, however, the postal saving system's 2% interest rate was no
longer competitive and its deposits had begun to shrink, making it little use as a potential
source of government finance. In any case, the Treasury's savings bond program was well
established by then and the federal government was no longer running consistent deficits,
ending any appeal to the Congress for keeping postal savings as a funding vehicle.
Government studies in the late 1940s and early 1950s confirmed the bankers' earlier
conclusion that the system was no longer justified: The so-called "Hoover Report"
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    The Postal Savings System of the United States   , cited above.
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 Zaun, pp. 44 ff.
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prepared for the Executive Branch in 1949, and an audit by the General Accounting Office
of the Congress in 1952, both questioned whether its original aims were still applicable.
Subsequent commissions went further, recommending that it be discontinued, and bills to
end the system began to be introduced in Congress regularly starting in 1952. By 1965, the
Postmasters General himself lent his support to abolishing the system as part of the
Johnson Administration's effort to streamline the federal government. With fewer than a
million depositors, the system had no significant constituency to support its survival. The
only strong opposition came from the postal workers' union, but its argument that
"hundreds" of clerks might have their jobs downgraded, if not abolished, fell on deaf ears.
The proposal was passed with little debate in 1966, and provisions made to close the
existing accounts of the postal savings system over the next several years.
III. Comparisons with Japan
A. Origins and prewar experience
Japan was one of the first countries to create a postal savings system, in 1875.35 Its
designers took the United Kingdom’s system as their model. At the time, the U.K. system,
started in 1861, had previously been emulated by New Zealand (1867), Canada (1868) and
Belgium (1870). The Japanese planners’ stated goals were to improve the people’s
livelihood by encouraging thrift, and to gather small savings to provide capital to industry.
The Meiji elite evidently judged commoners to be ignorant of the habit of saving, and took
credit for teaching this virtue by – among other efforts – the postal savings system..36 The
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 The Appendix gives dates for other industrial countries, so far as I have been able to determine
them.
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 This view is still found in standard accounts of the system’s origins: See, for instance, Takezawa
(1996) and Yoshino (1996). Yoshino recounts the story – which I was told more than once during my
brief effort to garner Japanese economists’ views on this topic – of a visit by Maejima Hisoka, the
principal architect of postal savings in Japan, to the famous monk Shimaji Mokurai to request support
36
domestic money order service, initiated along with savings deposits in 1875, was also
considered an important benefit for ordinary Japanese. Direct transfer (giro) services were
added starting in 1906. And, the post office also offered life insurance beginning in 1916,
as it was considered that private insurance companies did not cater to the needs of middle
and low-income households.
The effort made was substantial, such that postal offices offering saving services existed in
all the cities, towns, and villages of Japan by 1900. According to Teranishi, there were
about 10,000 of these depositories during 1900 to 1940 – a larger number than served the
vastly greater area of the United States during most of the U.S. system’s life.37  There is
little dispute that postal savings thus made basic retail banking services more accessible to
many people. Postal savings facilities, as compared with private banks whose operations
tended to be concentrated in cities, were more available and more heavily used in areas of
Japan with low population density. The very small size of many deposits, as well, indicated
that the system was serving low-income households more than private institutions did.38
On the lending side, the system was originally designed as a "narrow bank" in the sense
that its assets were the contemporary equivalent of today's risk-free national government
bonds. Initially, all funds were placed with the First National Bank, a private bank licensed
to issue currency before the creation of the Bank of Japan in 1882. Placements began to be
                                                                                                                                                
for the promotion of savings among the people, only to be turned down on the grounds that thrift was
“not consistent with Japanese customs”. Patrick offers a very different – and more plausible –
interpretation: that postal savings’ remarkable growth within its first ten years attests to the
widespread saving habit that existed among even low-income groups at the time (p. 272).
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 The U.S. postal savings system had 12,820 locations in 1913, before the decision was made to
abolish those in fourth class districts that had no deposits. From 1915 on, the number ranged from 6300
(in 1921) to 8261 (in 1952). As of 1996, the Japanese system had over 24,500 offices where saving
and payment services are provided.
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 Takezawa provides some documentation on both points, up to 1935 and 1940. (She notes, however,
that prevalence of smaller deposits can also reflect changes in the use of postal accounts as demand
deposits, rather than for savings, since they had desirable properties for making payments.)
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made with the Ministry of Finance in 1878 and from 1884 they were exclusively in the
latter. These funds were managed along with other funds of the Ministry's Deposits Bureau
and the postal insurance system, all of which were placed in government bonds or the
equivalent up until the late 1890s. At times – mainly during the Russo-Japanese War in
1905 and again at the time of World War I in Europe – a significant portion was also held
in monetary-quality foreign assets.
The practice of channeling postal savings, along with other moneys placed with the
Deposits Bureau, into lending via government-related banks began in 1898, as part of the
emergency assistance program put together for the Osaka Spinning Company. However,
such activities became sizable only after 1912 and, according to Teranishi, were still
considered exceptional until the system began to be institutionalized after the mid 1920s.
By the late 1930s, they acquired a form similar to the postwar system (now called the
zaiseitoyushi, or zaito), in which postal savings and other funds are gathered in the MoF’s
Trust Fund Bureau (corresponding to the prewar Deposit Bureau), and then on-lent to
various government-affiliated institutions whose lending is guided by MoF officials in line
with policy objectives such as building the country’s economic infrastructure.39 From this
history, it is clear that the Japanese postal savings system was able to be used for
stabilization purposes, but whether and when this happened was a matter of ad hoc
administrative judgments rather than any automatic feature of the system's design. The
notion of maintaining a neutral, narrowly defined investment function on the "exit" side,
which had been inherited as part of the European model of a postal bank, probably was not
central to the appeal that the postal savings idea had for Meiji designers. In any case, the
convenience of using postal savings as a slush fund for various policy lending purposes
seems to have won out easily over time.












































Postal savings growth to 1950
Source: Bank of Japan,     Hundred-year Statistics of the Japanese Economy   
On the deposit side, the fortunes of the postal savings system from the very beginning
were closely intertwined with the ups and downs of private institutions serving small
savers. Most particularly, the system competed with the savings banks, which paid higher
interest rates on deposits than the postal bank and thus had the advantage in normal times.
Savings banks were first established in 1880, and experienced several waves of expansion
and contraction related to the period's wars, recessions, banking panics, and – not least – to
the pendulum of official laxity alternating with re-regulation.40 The system’s role got a
boost during its first decade from the Matsukata deflation, which hurt many private banks,
and by 1885 it accounted for 4.8% of the entire banking system, three times the size of the
savings banks. Savings banks – many of them unsoundly managed according to
Takezawa’s account – burgeoned in the early 1880s, until the authorities clamped down on
new establishments in 1884 and subsequently implemented a restrictive savings bank law
in 1893. Then, when protests led to relaxation of the supervisory standards in 1895, the
savings banks took off again, far surpassing the growth of the postal savings system and
of ordinary banks during the next five years. The overextended savings bank industry went
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  Patrick (1967), including table on p. 273; Arai, pp. 15-18; and Takezawa (1996). The latter gives a
more detailed account of the savings banks’ ups and downs from 1880 on.
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through a severe crunch during the financial panic that followed the Sino-Japanese War in
1901, and the postal savings system’s growth far outstripped that of private savings banks
during the next several years. The lesson was repeated with the panic of 1907 and – most
emphatically of all – again in the great banking crisis of 1927.
Teranishi's analysis of the experience between 1900 and 1940 found that the relative
demand for postal savings deposits was well explained by a combination of interest-rate
differential and bank safety concerns. His model allowed for substitution among time and
savings deposits at three classes of bank: city banks, local banks (other banks including
savings banks), and the postal bank, but otherwise was similar to the one used above for
the United States between 1911 and 1966.41 Coefficients for the price variable (the
difference between the rates paid on postal versus ordinary-bank deposits, since separate
data are not available for the two classes of private bank) and the confidence variable (the
number of bank failures as a proportion of existing banks) had correct signs although they
were not always signficant; the combined adjustment ratio was about 0.17; and the
coefficient of the wealth variable (measured as total time and savings deposits per capita)
was positive but insignificant, an effect that Teranishi attributed to trend.
The main difference between this picture and the one drawn for the United States is that the
safety attraction of postal savings is primarily relative to local banks, not city banks. The
latter, in fact, tended to benefit during periods of uncertainty – although not as much as
postal savings did. According to Teranishi, failures were almost entirely confined to local
banks, and city banks even refrained from merging with failing institutions. Instead, local
bank numbers shrank drastically through a process of bankruptcy and mergers among
themselves.
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 The term “city bank” is used here, following Teranishi’s usage, to refer to the “big five” banks that
formed the core of the prewar banking system. It should not be confused with the postwar grouping of
“City banks”, which is defined by banking regulations.
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The most dramatic flight to postal savings occurred during the 1920s and early 1930s: As
can be seen in Chart 14 below, their share of total household savings deposits more than
doubled to 20% in the decade to 1931. The savings banks were particularly hard hit by the
financial panic of 1920, having greatly overexpanded in the 1915-1920 period under a 1915
re-regulation which, while nominally aiming at closer prudential supervision, failed to limit
their lending activities. Yet another new savings bank law was passed in 1921, limiting
small savings deposits to specialized savings banks and imposing more restrictive
guidelines. The law favored the savings banks and their depositors with tax exemptions,
but the prudential requirements for reserving 1/3 of deposits in government bonds and
other portfolio restrictions led to a massive consolidation via mergers: the number of
savings banks decining by three-quarters in the first year of the new law.42 For most banks,
the big wave of failures occurred later, during the banking panic of 1927; this wave had
relatively little impact on the already shrunken savings bank industry but it was once again
accompanied by an accelerated shift to postal savings.
The decade or so that began in 1920 was of course a turbulent one world-wide, and Japan's
increased involvement in the global economy had exposed it to fallout from booms and
busts in the United States and Europe. But, equally importantly, this was a time when the
leaders of Japan espoused – and practiced – a brand of laissez-faire philosophy that would
be considered extreme today even in the United States. The Bank of Japan refused, arguing
the need to avoid "moral hazard", to join assistance schemes for Japanese industrial
companies that became caught in difficulties during the 1920s and early 1930s. The
economic and financial downturns of this period were exacerbated by untimely resumption
of Japan’s gold-standard obligations, and perhaps by an excessively strict interpretation of
those obligations when they were in effect – in contrast with other gold-standard countries,
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including the United States, which availed themselves of considerable discretion in
conducting monetary policy. While the gold standard was a constraint, it was not an
absolute one, and these decisions were influenced by the explicit belief that recessions so
induced would help to improve the "quality" of Japanese industry by eliminating inefficient
players – most particularly the agricultural establishments and small firms and financial
institutions which by definition were considered to be not modern and not competitive.43 In
finance, the consequences were dramatically reflected in the falling numbers of banks,
which went from over 2000 in 1921 to less than 1000 by 1929, and to half that again by
the mid 1930s. The chart below is illustrative of the turmoil and its impact on postal
savings:
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B. Postwar Japanese experience
The postal savings system remained in existence throughout the Second World War –
indeed, it experienced its most dramatic growth ever during those turbulent years, as
shown in Chart 13 above, nearly quintupling its size between 1942 and 1945. The recipient
zaito lending network was recreated along with the rest of Japan's financial system in the
years following World War II. These structures were similar to those that had evolved by
the end of the pre-War period, but the context in which they operated was totally different.
With the memory of previous decades' turbulence fresh in mind, the postwar designers
created a financial system in which it came to be understood that every institution – most
particularly those whose liabilities were the savings of households – was backed by an
implicit official guarantee against any form of default. Small and rural institutions were
among the most protected, and activities of their larger counterparts were to be reined in as
43
needed to prevent their succumbing to "excessive" competition. It is tempting to suggest
that the postwar leaders sought exactly the opposite extreme of the spectrum from their
laissez-faire predecessors,44 creating an orderly society in which the protected small-firm
sector would keep underemployed workers off the streets, and in which depository failures
could never spark a financial panic. At any rate, whether or not it was initially intended as
part of the design, the postwar period until the 1990s has been characterized by a nearly
universal acceptance of an implicit government guarantee backing financial institutions'
obligations to household savers.






























Postal savings growth from 1950
Source: Bank of Japan,    Economic Statistics Annuals   
In this protective environment, concerns over safety of private banks could not have
remained a major variable in the demand for postal savings. It may have contributed to the
slower growth of postal savings compared to bank deposits during the 1950s, as
households gradually came to accept the new regime. But for the long haul, variations in
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postal savings demand must have been a function of relative price, convenience, and
product offerings. Both the post office and private banks introduced improvements along
the way, but not necessarily on the same timetable.
The system has nevertheless grown even more important during the postwar period than it
ever was before – strongly suggesting that its services are attractively priced relative to
comparable ones offered by the private sector. As of the end of 1996, Japanese households
had ¥222 trillion (the equivalent of about $2 trillion) in deposits at the post office, which
was almost 35% of households total deposit holdings. (Overall deposits, in turn, account
for a relatively large 64% of households’ total financial assets in Japan.) The postal life
insurance business is also large: Its assets were ¥96 trillion, 51% of the size of all 31
private life insurance companies combined, at end 1996. Both the deposit and insurance
arms of the post office occupy a far larger part of their respective markets in Japan than in
any other country.45 The only area where some other postal banks rival Japan’s is payment
services: The Japanese post office handles slightly over half of all domestic giro payments,
compared to about 70% in Sweden and 40% in the Netherlands.46
The clearest demand shift occurred after April 1988, with the abolition of the exemption
from income tax of interest income from savings deposits up to a prescribed limit for each
individual. This exemption (often referred to as the maruyu system) applied to savings
accounts at private institutions as well as the post office, but the limits were more
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effectively monitored at private banks than by the postal savings system.47 As a result, so
many savers held multiple tax-exempt accounts in different names that the total number of
postal savings accounts exceeded the population of Japan by the mid-1980s. The
unfairness of the phenomenon was much noted during the long debate about eliminating
the maruyu system, but the system’s popularity with voters proved a powerful obstacle for
many years, until the law eliminating the exemption was finally ended in 1988. The change
led to a substantial drop in postal savings' share after 1989, mainly in favor of commercial
banks. This episode certainly indicates some sensitivity to after-tax return, at least in the
case of a very large and well-publicized change.
In general, however, the differential between rates paid on postal and private bank deposits
was fixed under the administrative rate structure that lasted until 1992. The postal savings
system paid higher rates than banks on "ordinary deposits", which may have given it an
advantage in attracting deposits for payments purposes relative to the services offered. But
the bulk of postal savings (over 80% from the early 1970s on, and closer to 90% in recent
years) are in the form of  Postal Savings Certificates (Teigakuchokin), a special savings
deposit that the postal savings system first introduced in 1941 and whose main draw is as a
receptacle for longer-term savings. With the exception of short periods surrounding
changes in the official Discount rate (when the postal system sometimes managed to lag in
lowering, or lead in raising rates) pre-liberalization savings certificates paid the same
nominal interest rate as the longest-term time deposit available at commercial banks (one-
year up to 1970, two-year from 1973). For one-year deposits, the postal offering was a
percentage point lower than at commercial banks. When compounding is considered, the
comparative attraction of postal savings was effectively higher, but this differential too was
more or less constant until recently. In the 1990s, private banks’ deposit interest rates have
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been freed to market determination in the liberalization process that was completed in 1993,
and the postal savings system has been explicitly required to keep its rates more in line
with those on private deposits. As a result, the nominal interest advantage has been
eliminated for one-year deposits, and the differentials for longer-term deposits have
fluctuated in a 20 basis-point range around zero.
However, the character of the post office’s savings certificate product is unique: It offers a
fixed interest rate up to 10 years' maturity, but withdrawals can be made without penalty
after the first six months.48 As has been pointed out by a number of analysts, this is
equivalent to giving the depositor a "put" option whose value can be quite significant if
interest rates on competing investments are thought likely to rise. Obviously, its value also
implies significant risk to the institution offering such a deposit, in the form of possible
future outflows of deposits that would have to be replaced at higher rates. Kamada (1996)
has estimated the value of the "put option" feature of these deposits for a period starting
January 1992 using option pricing theory. The value is significant, at up to 69 basis points
when certificates are held for four years, and 1.45 percentage points when held for 10
years. Importantly, the value would vary over time as it depends on both the existing
interest-rate structure and households' expectations for future changes in interest rates. It is
possible, therefore, that much of the postwar variation in postal savings demand could be
explained by changes in a correctly measured interest-differential, although this would not
be easy to demonstrate with available data.
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With respect to the two original objectives of serving rural and low-income households, the
situation has changed a good deal over the postwar period. Clearly, the income-tax
avoidance feature of postal savings would have had greatest value to higher-income, not
lower-income, households in the period before 1988. And the limits on individual deposits
were progressively raised, from ¥1 million yen before 1973 to the present ceiling of ¥10
million in effect since 1991. Yoshino (1991) looked for evidence in prefectural data for
1986, and found that the correlation between location of facilities and average household
income is positive, for both post offices and private financial institutions.
In the same study, Yoshino found that a relationship between post office location and low
population density still held in 1986. As of 1995, it remains the case that the share of
personal deposits held in postal savings is negatively correlated with population density
across prefectures, while the share in banks is positively correlated. Credit unions and
credit cooperatives also tend to be located in more rural areas, however, and to have a larger
share of deposits there, while commercial banks favor more populated locations. However,
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the Japanese bankers’ association, in its pamphlet advocating privatization of postal
savings, argues that this geographical motivation for a public facility has virtually
disappeared. By their count, only 9 of the country’s 3255 municipal units (cities, towns,
and villages) lack any private retail banking facility, and two of these are precincts within
Tokyo (Zenkoku ginko kyokai rengokai, p. 3).
The safety motive for using postal savings has reappeared in the 1990s in Japan, now that
the never-fail policy for all private deposit-takers has become too costly to maintain. The
authorities have begun to permit closure of credit unions, credit cooperatives, and even a
few banks – although still promising to fortify the resources of the deposit insurance
corporation sufficiently to pay off all individual depositors. The revived increase since 1990
in postal savings' share of total savings deposits – at a time when its interest advantage has
been eaten away by liberalization and record-low interest rate levels – is widely attributed to
this change in regime. The prefectural data offer circumstantial evidence that this is true:
Among the greatest increases in postal share between 1990 and 1995, for example, have
been in Tokyo, Osaka, and other Kinki region prefectures, the same regions where all of
the actual closures have occurred so far. (The only other prefectures seeing an increase of
3.5 percentage points or more during those five years were Miyazaki and Kagoshima in
Kyushu, and Okinawa.)
The efficiency of the existing system in Japan is a much-debated point. Figures on
comparative operating costs, when adjusted for taxes, reserve requirements, and insurance
premiums that are imposed on private banks, tend to find the postal bank and its attendant
lending institutions broadly comparable with the City banks but lower cost compared to
regional banks.49   The postal system's advantage is mainly in non-wage costs including
that of physical facilities shared with post offices. These comparisons are rife with
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problems, including – to name just two – differences in business done and the greater
restrictions placed on commercial banks' choice of branch location. And, it should not be
viewed as a great comfort that the postal bank may be more efficient than smaller private
institutions, given the fact that Japan is clearly overbanked and likely to undergo major
consolidation of the industry in coming years.
One thing that is not in doubt is that the postal savings system is highly popular in Japan,
so that abolition is unlikely to be considered an option any time soon. Indeed, Japanese
savers seem to view it as uniformly more efficient and customer-oriented in its services
than any private competitors, most particularly City banks.50 This may say more about the
lack of competitive spirit among the supposedly "private" institutions in Japanese finance
than it does about the Post Office. But it is a marked contrast with the complaints about
inefficiency and rudeness that appear to have added momentum to the privatization
movements in New Zealand and the United Kingdom, and could be one aspect of the
debate in Japan that is genuinely unique.51
IV. Implications: What to do with a postal savings system?
It has become increasingly obvious that the salient characteristic of a postal bank is not so
much that it is "postal", as that it is a government bank backed by the full faith and credit of
the national authorities. The ability to make use of an extensive network of post offices
may make the institution somewhat more cost-effective, especially in rural areas, and allow
it to offer marginally higher interest rates than would otherwise be the case. But other
depositories such as credit unions also serve very small communities, and there are few
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localities nowadays that do not have the services of a bank, much less one of these thrift
institutions. Moreover, as more banking comes to be done via ATMs and the internet, the
question of physical location of banking offices will become even less important as time
goes on.
If this is true, then it is reasonable to view the postal bank as an alternative or supplement to
government-sponsored deposit insurance, a means to provide safe, convenient basic
deposit and payment services to retail customers. While there are sound reasons for
arguing – as some economists do – that the government should not be in this business at
all, experience shows that democratic governments do, in fact, find themselves obliged to
step in when the deposits of ordinary people are at risk. It therefore makes sense to design
the best – or least bad – system for assuring the safety of small deposits.
Deposit insurance has been instituted in both the United States and Japan for at least three
purposes: To help small banks compete against stronger counterparts, and thus foster a
banking system with many locally oriented players; to prevent bank runs and thus aid in
protecting systemic safety; and to afford small savers a safe banking outlet at low cost. The
first objective – although seldom explicit – may have been the most powerful reason
behind deposit insurance in practice. It is not served by postal savings: Indeed, the fiercest
opposition to postal banking has historically come from precisely those smaller, locally
based institutions that feared competition from the post office. However, promoting an
atomistic banking system is not a declared objective of current policy, and certainly has
little appeal on economic grounds in the present day.
The second, systemic objective can be aided by postal savings, although history shows that
this depends on the system being properly designed and judiciously administered. Some
economists argue that this need can be better served by commercial bankers themselves, as
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was done with the clearing houses or private deposit insurance schemes in some parts of
the pre-Federal Reserve United States.52 If that is believed, it becomes reasonable to
consider the postal bank as an alternative to sponsored deposit insurance as a way to assure
deposit safety for small savers. This was, in fact, the reasoning on which the U.S. postal
savings system was initially introduced in 1910. And it is consistent with one of the most
powerful arguments advanced for abolishing it after the FDIC was created in 1933. In
Japan, as well, one of the reasons advanced for privatizing postal savings is that the
existence of a government deposit insurance scheme makes its government backing
superfluous.53
But it is not a foregone conclusion that deposit insurance is a superior way to do this. The
history of federal deposit insurance – along with the supervisory apparatus that it requires –
is one of recurrent failure in the United States; and the same can be said of the history of
(implicit or explicit) government guarantee of private banks' deposits in Japan. The
resulting difficulties have been widely spaced in time during the Postwar period, in contrast
with the more frequent panics of the century before that, but these episodes nevertheless
reveal that the built-in problems of moral hazard have not been fully eliminated in any
known system's design. The United States since 1990 may be an exception: It appears to
have successfully implemented risk-based deposit premiums and a principle of protecting
small, but not large, depositors. However it remains to be seen whether these improved
practices will outlast the recent memory of the 1980s S&L debacle, or whether they are
another phase in the long cycle of regulatory laxity alternating with discipline.
A government bank is not free of moral hazard either, although the incentives for excessive
risk-taking are not what they are in an insured, for-profit bank especially in difficult times.
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In fact, the zaito institutions' nonperforming loans to the Japan National Railways
Settlement Corporation and the Japan National Forestry Corporation have become an issue
in contemporary Japan. If the suggestion made above is correct, that the Savings Certificate
product seriously underprices interest-rate risks taken by the postal savings system, then
the moral hazard problem may be greater than yet revealed. As has been pointed out by
others, the consequences of this mispricing will not be realized during the current period of
super-low interest rates, but only later when market rates start to rise.
The question, therefore, should be: What system could best be designed to minimize the
hazard of inappropriate risk-taking, and maximize the incentives to deal with problems
appropriately when they do occur? In a government-sponsored deposit insurance system,
the burden is on prudential supervision of banks and pricing of deposit premiums that
reflects risk – neither of which has much of a record of success. If a government bank is
used, then the obvious suggestion is to return to the original "narrow-bank" version of
postal savings, limiting investments to credit-risk-free government bonds. This would not
resolve the question of what to do with government-sponsored lending institutions – it
would leave those to be justified on their own –  but it would provide a yardstick for
whether or not the postal savings system is hedging its (interest-rate and liquidity) risks
and covering costs, uncluttered by questions of credit risk.
An intriguing question is whether this should eliminate the need for having government-
sponsored deposit insurance at all. A proposal along those lines, which comes closest to
the "narrow bank" ideas promoted by some U.S. central bankers and economists during
the 1980s54, has been offered by Professor Shoichi Royama (1997) in his outline for
reform. However, many economists and policymakers would argue that insurance should
be required for all small deposits, or at least that can be used for transactions, to ensure the
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payments system against bank runs. If this is the position taken, the questions become
more complex: Postal savings has to be considered as a supplement – and competing
alternative – to insured private deposits, and the need to set up a complex supervisory
apparatus to deal with moral hazard is not avoided.
Whatever the position on deposit insurance, the "narrow bank" idea could not be
implemented without distorting the financial system if postal savings were expected to
remain at their present size – almost two-thirds the size of the entire Japanese national
government debt outstanding as of the end of fiscal 1996. However, size is unlikely to be
such a problem if the second – in any case essential – requirement is included in the design:
that is, if the system's products are priced fully to cover their costs and risks. Setting
market-based interest rates for Savings Certificates  should no longer be difficult with
today's highly developed swap markets available as a hedging and pricing base. It is an
open question, of course, whether the Savings Certificate product – or the postal savings
system itself – would survive such pricing; however, this seems to be a question that can
be left to markets to decide. Reserve requirements and corporate taxes would need to be
assessed on the same basis as for commercial banks (although the latter may not be an
issue if the postal system is operated to break even rather than earn a profit). Deposit
insurance presumably would not be required, as the postal system would not be allowed to
undertake financial risks – nor to earn the corresponding returns.
In all likelihood, the postal bank would survive on some scale for as long as the memory
of current bank failures is still fresh. Over a longer period, if Japanese bankers and
authorities succeed in establishing a truly safe and well functioning system of private
intermediaries, savers are likely to forget this concern and become less willing to settle for
the low return of risk-free assets embodied in a postal deposit. But this seems a better way
to decide the size of the system than the suggestions now being bandied about in Japan.
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Most of those assume that the authorities should shrink the system over time based on
some arbitrary annual percent-reduction target. Alternatively, it is suggested that the system
be carved up into regional sub-banks – an idea that runs totally counter to the trends toward
regional integration and consolidation seen in banking systems, like that of the United
States, where cost-efficiency has become a priority.
The options that are now widely discussed for Japan's postal savings system contain some
elements of the “narrow bank” idea. Most look to separate the system from the
government lending institutions, which are to be made to stand on their own. And,
presumably, any reform would at least claim to reassess the system's pricing so that it
would more accurately cover risks and costs borne. But the primary suggestion is a move
toward privatization, which would likely mean a broadening, rather than a narrowing, of
the postal bank’s activities. In New Zealand and several European countries that have
reformed their postal banks, the move to impose market discipline has paved the way for a
broader set of both investment activities and product offerings. Some have begun offering
insurance for the first time – which is noteworthy because it is the opposite direction from
that called for in the initial proposal offered this fall by the Japanese government’s advisory
committee on  administrative reform: That proposal would have privatized the postal
insurance business separately from the postal savings bank.55
Presumably, the drift of the current discussion means that Japan will adopt a deposit
insurance model rather than that of a narrow postal bank. This is certainly a path that
should be considered, one that other countries have followed with seeming success.
However, the debate – and the resulting design – would surely benefit if it were admitted
that this is not the only way to achieve the goals being sought. In fact, the most useful thing
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would be if the debate were to start from making those goals explicit, distinguishing clearly
among alternate aims such as: helping households do their banking business, helping the
monetary authorities assure systemic stability, and/or helping small depository institutions
to stay alive. With priorities established among these, it should be possible to more
reasonably assess the costs and benefits of whichever structure is used to meet them, and
to make rational decisions about system design.
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Appendix: Postal banks in industrial countries
Country Date of Present
introduction status
savings     giro
Austria 1883        1883 Public utility (post office and bank). Functions as a bank
via p.o.s and owns shares in cooperating private bks.
Belgium 1870         1913 Public utility (p.o. and bank offering giro svces; 
deposits offered by private savings banks at p.o.s)
Denmark 1991         1920 Incorporated as a bank; 25% privatized as of 1991.
Finland 1887         1939 Incorporated as a state-owned bank; markets services
via p.o.s but link to p.o.s is lessening.
France 1881         1918 Public utility (post office and bank), restructured 1991;
required to break even.
Germany 1939         1909 Public utility (postal bank only) restructured in 1989.
Greece 1902  na Public utility (postal bank only)
Ireland 1923  none Limited liability company (post office and bank)
Italy 1876 1918 Public utility (post office and bank)
Luxembourg none  1911 Public utility (post office, bank and telecomm.); deposits
offered in early 1900s but ended as no longer needed.
Netherlands 1881 1918 Inc. as a state-owned bank, 1986; later merged with private
institutions; now part of ING group; 25% state-owned.
Norway 1950 1942 Public utility; p.o. offers giro services; separate postal bank 
offers deposits at p.o.s.
Portugal date na none Public utility (postal office and bank) restructured 1989.
Spain 1916 1973 Incorporated in 1991 as a state-owned bank.
Sweden 1884 1925 Public utility (p.o. and bank); required to be profitable;
provides services at p.o. along with private banks.
Switzerland none  date? Public utility (post office, bank and telecomm.); offers 
payment services only.
United Kingdom 1861 1968 Fully privatized: sold in 1989 to Alliance & Leicester 
building society,which offers banking services at p.o.s.
Japan 1875 1906 Public utility (post office, bank, and insurance)
New Zealand 1867 na Privatized: Postbank Ltd. created in 1986; sold to ANZ 
bank in 1989.
Australia ? ?
United States 1910 none Abolished in 1966
Canada 1868 ? Abolished in 1968
Note: “Giro” refers to a direct transfer of funds from or to a postal banking account
Source: (mainly) Elixmann (1992)
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